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Abstract
Adversarial attacks against neural networks are a problem of
considerable importance, for which effective defenses are not
yet readily available. We make progress toward this problem
by showing that non-negative weight constraints can be used
to improve resistance in specific scenarios. In particular, we
show that they can provide an effective defense for binary clas-
sification problems with asymmetric cost, such as malware or
spam detection. We also show the potential for non-negativity
to be helpful to non-binary problems by applying it to image
classification.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been an increased research effort in ex-
ploring adversarial examples which fool machine learning
classifiers (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2015; Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017a; Szegedy et al., 2014; Yuan
et al., 2017). The majority of the existing research focuses on
the image domain, where an example is generated by making
small perturbations to input pixels in order to make a large
change in the distribution of predicted class probabilities. We
are particularly interested in adversarial attacks for malware
detection, which is the task of determining if a file is benign
or malicious. This involves a real-life adversary (the malware
author) who is attempting to subvert detection tools, such
as anti-virus programs. With machine learning approaches
to malware detection becoming more prevalent (Raff et al.,
2018; Pascanu et al., 2015; Saxe and Berlin, 2015; Sahs and
Khan, 2012), this is an area that urgently requires solutions
to the adversarial problem. Because an adversary is actively
attempting to subvert outputs, small decreases in accuracy
when not under attack are an acceptable cost for remediating
targeted attacks. In this scenario, the effective accuracy of
the system would be the accuracy under attack, which will
be at or near zero without proper defenses.
For example, Raff et al. (2018) trained a convolutional
neural network called MalConv to distinguish between be-
nign and malicious Windows executable files. When working
with images, any pixel can be arbitrarily altered, but this
freedom does not carry over to the malware case. The ex-
ecutable format follows stricter rules which constrain the
options available to the attacker (Kreuk et al., 2018; Russu
et al., 2016; Grosse et al., 2016; Suciu, Coull, and Johns,
2018). Perturbing an arbitrary byte of an executable file will
most likely change the functionality of the file or prevent it
from executing entirely. This property is useful for defending
against an adversarial attack, as a malware author needs to
evade detection with a working malicious file.
Kreuk et al. (2018) were able to bypass these limitations
by applying gradient-based attacks to create perturbations
which were restricted to bytes located in unused sections
of malicious executable files. The adversarial examples re-
mained just as malicious, but the classifier was fooled by the
introduction of overwhelmingly benign yet unused sections
of the file. This is possible because the adversary controls the
input, and the EXE format allows unused sections. Because
of the complications and obfuscations that are available to
malware authors, it is not necessarily possible to tell that a
section is unused, even if its contents appear random. This is
an additive only adversary — i.e., the attacker can only add
features — which has been widely used and will be the focus
of our study.
An analogy to the image domain would be an attacker that
could create new pixels which represent the desired class and
put them outside of the cropping box of the image, such that
they would be in the digital file, but never be seen by a human
observer. This contrasts with a standard adversarial attack on
images, since the attacker is typically limited to changing the
values of existing pixels in the image rather than introducing
new pixels entirely.
Given these unique characteristics and costs, we note that
the malware case is one where we care only about targeted
adversarial attacks. The adversary always wants to fool de-
tectors into calling malicious files benign. As such, we in-
troduce an approach to tackle targeted adversarial attacks by
exploiting non-negative learning constraints. We will high-
light related work in section 2. In section 3 we will detail our
motivation for non-negative learning for malware, as well as
how we generalize its use to multi-class problems like image
classifiers. The attack scenario and experiments on malware,
spam, and image domains will be detailed in section 4. In
section 5 we will demonstrate how our approach reduces
evasions to almost 0% for malware and exactly 0% spam
detection. On images we show improvements to robustness
against confident adversarial attacks against images, showing
that there is potential for non-negativity to aid in non-binary
problems. We will end with our conclusions in section 6.
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2 Related Work
The issues of targeted adversarial binary classification prob-
lems, as well as the additive adversary, was first brought
up by Dalvi et al. (2004), who noted its importance in a
number of domains like fraud detection, counter terrorism,
surveillance, and others. There have been several attempts
at creating machine learning classifiers which can defend
against such adversarial examples. Yuan et al. (2017) provide
a thorough survey of both attacks and defenses specifically
for deep learning systems. Some of these attacks will be used
to compare the robustness of our technique to prior methods.
In our case we are learning against a real life adversary
in a binary classification task, similar to the initial work in
this space on evading spam filters (Lowd and Meek, 2005b;
Dalvi et al., 2004; Lowd and Meek, 2005a). Our malware
case gives the defender a slight comparative advantage in
constraining the attack to produce a working binary, where
spam authors can insert more arbitrary content.
Prior works have looked at similar weight constraint ap-
proaches to adversarial robustness. Kołcz and Teo (2009) uses
a technique to keep the distribution of learned weights asso-
ciated with features as even as possible during training. By
preventing any one feature from becoming overwhelmingly
predictive, they force the adversary to manipulate many fea-
tures in order to cause a misclassification. Similarly, Grosse et
al. (2016) tested a suite of feature reduction methods specif-
ically in the malware domain (Grosse et al., 2016). First,
they used the mutual information between features and the
target class in order to limit the representation of each file
to those features. Like Kołcz and Teo, they created an alter-
native feature selection method to limit training to features
which carried near equal importance. They found both of
these techniques to be ineffective.
Our approach is also a feature reduction technique. The
difference is that we train on all features, but only retain the
capacity to distinguish a reduced number of features at test
time — namely, only those indicative of the positive class.
Training on all features allows the model to automatically
determine which are important for the target class and utilizes
the other features to accurately set a threshold, represented
by the bias term, for determining when a requisite quantity of
features are present for assigning samples to the target class.
Chorowski and Zurada (2015) used non-negative weight
constraints in order to train more interpretable neural net-
works. They found that the constraints caused the neurons to
isolate features in meaningful ways. We build on this tech-
nique in order to isolate features while also preventing our
models from using the features predictive of the negative
class.
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2015) used RBF net-
works to show that low capacity models can be robust to
adversarial perturbations but found they lack the ability to
generalize. With our methods we find we are able to achieve
generalization while also producing low confidence predic-
tions during targeted attacks.
3 Isolating Classes with Non-Negative
Weight Constraints
We will start by building an intuition on how logistic regres-
sion with non-negative weight constraints assigns predictive
power to only features indicative of the positive (+) class
while ignoring those associated with the negative (−) class.
Let C(·) be a trained logistic regression binary classifier
of the form C(x) = sign
(
wTx+ b
)
, where w is the vector
of non-negative learned coefficients of C(·), x is a vector of
boolean features for a given sample, and b is a scalar bias. The
decision boundary of C(·) exists where wTx+ b = 0, and
becausewTx ≥ 0 ∀ x, the bias b must be strictly negative in
order for C(·) to have the capacity to assign samples to both
classes. The decision function can then be rewritten as:
C(x) =
{
(+) wTx ≥ |b|
(−) wTx < |b| (1)
Because w is non-negative, the presence of any feature
xi ∈ x can only increase the result of the dot product, thus
pushing the classification toward (+). Weights associated
to features that are predictive of class (−) will therefore
be pushed toward 0 during training. When no features are
present (x = ~0) the model defaults to a classification of
(−) due to the negative bias b. Unless a sufficient number of
features predictive of class (+) are present in the sample, the
decision will remain unchanged. A classifier trained in this
way will use features indicative of the (−) class to set the
bias term, but will not allow those features to participate in
classification at test time. The same logic follows for logistic
regression with non-boolean features if the features are also
non-negative or scaled to be non-negative before training.
Given a problem with asymmetric misclassification goals,
we can leverage this behavior to build a defense against ad-
versarial attacks. For malware detection, the malware author
wishes to avoid detection as malware (+), and instead induce
a false detection as benign (−). However, there is no desire
for the author of a benign program to make their applica-
tions be detected as malicious. Thus, if we model malware
as the positive class with non-negative weights, nothing can
be added to the file to make it seem more benign to the
classifier C(·). Because executable programs must maintain
functionality, the malware author can not trivially remove
content to reduce the malicious score either. This leaves the
attacker with no recourse but to re-write their application, or
perform more non-trivial acts such as packing to obscure in-
formation. Such obfuscations can then be remediated through
existing approaches like dynamic analysis (Ugarte-Pedrero
et al., 2016; Chistyakov et al., 2017).
Notably, this method also applies to neural networks with
a sigmoid output neuron as long as the input to the final
layer and the final layer’s weights are constrained to be non-
negative. The output layer of such a network is identical to
our logistic regression example. The cumulative operation
of the intermediate layers φ(·) can be interpreted as a re-
representation of the features before applying the logistic
regression such as C(x) = sign
(
wTφ(x) + b
)
. We will
denote when a model is trained in a non-negative fashion by
appending “+ ” to its name.
The ReLU function is a good choice for intermediate layers
as it maintains the required non-negative representation and
is already found in most modern neural networks.
For building intuition, in Figure 1 we provide an example
of how this works for neural networks using MNIST. To fool
the network into predicting the positive class (one) as the
negative class (zero), the adversary must now make larger
removals of content — to the point that the non-negative
attack is no longer a realistic input.
Figure 1: Left: Original Image; Middle: Gradient attack on
LeNet; Right: Gradient attack on non-negative LeNet+. The
attack on the standard model was able to add pixel intensity in
a round, zero-shaped area to fool the classifier into thinking
this was a zero. The attack on the constrained model was
forced to remove pixel intensity from the one rather than
adding in new values elsewhere.
It should be noted that constraining a model in this way
does reduce the amount of information available for discrimi-
nating samples at inference time, and a drop in classification
accuracy is likely to occur for most problems. The trade off
between adversarial robustness and performance should be
analyzed for the specific domain and use case.
A practical benefit to our approach is that it is simple to
implement. In the general case, on can simply use gradient
decent with a projection step that clips negative values to
zero after each step update. We implemented our approach
in Keras (Chollet, 2015) by simply adding the “NonNeg”
constraint to each layer in the model.1
3.1 Non-Negativity and Multi-Class Classification
The primary focus of our work is on binary tasks like mal-
ware and spam detection, it is also worth asking if it can be
applied to multi-class problems. In this work we show that
non-negativity can still have some benefit in this scenario,
but we find it necessary to re-phrase how such tasks are han-
dled. Normally, one would use the softmax (softmax(v)i =
exp(vi)/
∑n
j=1 exp(vj)) on the un-normalized probabilities
v given by the final layer. The probability of a class i is
then taken as softmax(v)i. However we find that the softmax
activation makes it easier to attack networks.
Take the non attacked activation pattern v, where vi > vj
∀ j 6= i. Now consider the new activation pattern vˆ, which is
produced by an adversarially perturbed input with the goal of
inducing a prediction as class q instead of i. Then it is neces-
sary to force vˆq > vˆi. Yet even if vˆi ≈ vi, the probability of
class i can be made arbitrarily low by continuing to maximize
the response of vˆq. This means we are able to diminish the
1https://keras.io/constraints/
apparent probability of class i without having impacted the
model’s response to class i. Phrased analogously as an image
classification problem, adversaries don’t need to remove the
amount of “cat” in a photo to induce a decision of “potato,”
but only increase the amount of “potato.”
In addition Chorowski and Zurada (2015) proved that a
non-negative network trained with softmax activation can
be transformed into an equivalent unconstrained network.
This means there is little reason to expect our non-negative
approach to provide benefit if we stay with the softmax acti-
vation, as it has an equivalent unconstrained form and should
be equally susceptible to all adversarial attacks. As such we
must move away from softmax to get the benefits of our
non-negative approach in a multi-class scenario.
Instead we can look at the classification problem in a one-
vs-all fashion by replacing the softmax activation over K
classes with K independent classifications trained with the
binary cross-entropy loss and using the sigmoid activation
σ(z) = 1/(1 + exp(−z)). Final probabilities after training
are obtained by normalizing the sigmoid responses to sum to
one. We find that this strategy combined with non-negative
learning provides some robustness against an adversary pro-
ducing targeted high-confidence attacks (e.g., the network is
99% sure the cat is a potato). The one-vs-all component make
it such that increasing the confidence of a new class even-
tually requires reducing the confidence of the original class.
The non-negativity increases the difficulty of this removal
step, resulting in destructive changes to the image.
We make two important notes on how we apply non-
negative training for image classification. First, we pre-
train the network using the standard softmax activation, and
then re-train the weights with our one-vs-all style and non-
negative constraints on the final fully connected layers. Doing
so we find only a small difference in accuracy between re-
sults, where training non-negative networks from scratch
often has reduced accuracy. Second, we continue to use batch
normalization without constraints. This is because batch nor-
malization can be rolled into the bias term and as a re-scaling
of the weights, and so does not break the non-negative con-
straint in any way. We find its positive impact on convergence
greater when training with the non-negative constraints.
4 Experimental Methodology
Having defined the mechanism by which we will defend
against targeted adversarial attacks, we will investigate its
application to two malware detection models, one spam detec-
tion task, and four image classification tasks. We will spend
more time introducing the malware attacks, as readers may
not have as much experience with this domain.
For malware, we will look at MalConv (Raff et al., 2018), a
recently proposed neural network that learns from raw bytes.
We will also consider an N-Gram based model (Raff et al.,
2016). Both of these techniques are applied to the raw bytes
of a file. We use the same 2,000,000 training and 80,000
testing datums as used in Raff and Nicholas (2017).
Following recommendations by Biggio, Fumera, and Roli
(2014) we will specify the threat model under which we
perform our evaluations. In all cases, our threat model will
assume a white-box adversary that has full knowledge of the
models, their weights, and the training data. For our binary
classification problems, we assume in the threat model that
our adversary can only add new features to the model (i.e., in
the feature vector space they can change a zero valued feature
to non-zero, but can not alter an already non-zero value).
We recognize that this threat model does not encompass
all possible adversaries, but note that it is one of the most
commonly used adversarial models spanning many domains.
The “Good Word” attack on spam messages is itself an ex-
ample of this threat model’s action space, and one of the
initial works in adversarial learning noted its wide applica-
bility (Lowd and Meek, 2005a). In a recent survey, Maiorca,
Biggio, and Giacinto (2018) found that 9 out of 10 works
in evading malicious PDF detectors used the additive only
threat model, and these additive adversaries succeeded in
both white-box and black-box attacks. Demontis et al. (2017)
considered both the additive only adversary, as well as one
which could add or remove features, as applied to android
malware detection. On their Android data, they demonstrate
a learning approach which provides bounds on adversary suc-
cess under both adversary action models, making it robust but
still vulnerable. Under the white-box additive attack scenario,
their Secure-SVM detection rate drops from 95% on normal
test data down to 60% when attacked. Finally, for the case
of Windows PE data, three different works have attacked the
MalConv model using the additive adversary (Kreuk et al.,
2018; Kolosnjaji et al., 2018; Suciu, Coull, and Johns, 2018).
The additive threat model makes sense to study, as it is
easier to implement for the adversary and currently success-
ful in practice. For this reason, it makes little sense for the
adversary to consider a more powerful threat model (e.g.,
adding and removing features) which would increase their
costs and effort, when the simpler and cheaper alternative
works. We will show in section 5 that while not perfect, our
non-negative defense is the first to demonstrably thwart the
additive adversary while still obtaining reasonable accuracies.
This forces a potential adversary to “step up” to a more pow-
erful model, which increases their effort and cost. We contend
this is of intrinsic value eo ipso. Below we will review addi-
tional details regarding the threat model for each data-type
we consider (Windows PE, emails, and images). This is fol-
lowed by specifics on how the attacks are carried out for each
classification algorithm as the details are different in all cases
due to model and problem diversity.
Windows PE Threat Model Specifics For PE malware we
use the appending of an unused section as the attack vector for
technical simplicity. The adversary will be allowed to append
any desired number of bytes into an added and unused section
of the binary file, until no change in the evasion rate occurs.
Our approach should still work if the adversary performed
insertions between functions rather than at the end of the file.
Real malware authors often employ packing to obfuscate
the entire binary. This work does not consider defense against
packing obfuscation, except to note that the common de-
fensive technique is to employ dynamic analysis. Our non-
negative approach can be applied to the features derived from
dynamic analysis as well, but beyond the scope of this pa-
per. The possibility of evading non-negativity on dynamic
features requires addressing the cat-and-mouse game around
VM detection, stealthy malware, and the nature of features
used. This discussion is important, but beyond the current am-
bit, which we limit to static analysis. We are interested here
in whether or not non-negativity has benefit to the additive
adversary, not more sophisticated ones.
Spam Threat Model Specifics For spam detection the ad-
versary will be restrained to the insertion of new content into
an existing spam message. This is because we are interested
in the lower-effort “good word” attack scenario. Despite be-
ing less sophisticated, it remains effective today. Tackling
wholly changed and newly crafted spam messages is beyond
our current purview.
Image Threat model Specifics Image classification does
not exhibit the asymmetric error costs that malware and spam
do. The purpose of studying it is to determine if our non-
negativity can have benefit to multi-class problems. It is
intuitive that the answer would be “no,” but we nevertheless
find that some limited benefit exists.
In this threat model, there is no “adding” or “removing”
features, due to the intrinsic nature of images. As such we
consider the L1 distance between a original image x, and
its adversarially perturbed counterpart xˆ. The adversary may
arbitrarily alter any pixels, so long as ‖x− xˆ‖1 < , where 
is a problem-dependent maximum distance.
4.1 Attacking MalConv
MalConv is the primary focus of our interest, as gradient
based attacks can not naively be applied to its architecture.
Only recently have attacks been proposed (Kolosnjaji et
al., 2018; Kreuk et al., 2018), and we will show that non-
negativity allows us to thwart these adversaries. In MalConv,
raw bytes of an executable are passed through a learned
embedding layer which acts as a lookup table to transform
each byte into an 8-dimensional vector of real values. This
representation is then passed through a 1-dimensional gated
convolution, global max pooling, and then a fully connected
layer with sigmoid output. To handle varying file sizes, all
sequences of bytes are padded to a fixed length of 2,100,000
using a special “End of File” value (256) from outside of the
normal range of bytes (0–255).
The raw bytes are both discrete and non-ordinal, which
prevents gradient based attacks from manipulating them di-
rectly. Kreuk et al. (2018) (and independently Kolosnjaji et
al. (2018)) devised a clever way of modifying gradient based
attacks to work on EXEs, even with a non-differentiable em-
bedding layer, and we will briefly recap their approach. This
is done by performing the gradient search of an adversar-
ial example in the 8-dimensional vector space produced by
the embedding layer. A perturbed vector is then mapped to
the byte which produces the nearest neighbor in the embed-
ding space. Keeping with the notation of Kreuk et al., let
M ∈ Rn×d be the lookup table from the embedding layer
such that M : X → Z where X is the set of n possible
bytes and Z ⊆ Rd is the embedding space. Then for some
sequence of bytes x = (x0, x1, . . . , xL), we generate a se-
quence of vectors z = (M [x0],M [x1], . . . ,M [xL]) were
M [xi] indicates row xi ofM . Now we generate a new vec-
tor z˜ = z + δ where δ is a perturbation generated from
an adversarial attack. We map each element z˜i ∈ z˜ back to
byte space by finding the nearest neighbor of z˜i among the
rows ofM . By applying this technique to only specific safe
regions of a binary, the execution of gradient based attacks
against MalConv are possible without breaking the binary.
To ensure that a “safe” area exists, they append an unused
section to the binary. The larger this appended section is, the
more space the adversary has to develop a strong enough
signal of “benign-ness” to fool the algorithm.
We replicate the attack done by Kreuk et al. (2018) which
uses the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy, 2015) to generate an adversarial ex-
ample in the embedding space. We find our z˜ by solving:
z˜ = z+  · sign
(
∇z ˜`(z, y;θ)), where ˜`(·) is the loss func-
tion of our model parameterized by θ and z is the embedded
representation of some input with label y. The new z˜ is then
mapped back into byte space using the method previously dis-
cussed. We performed the attack on 1000 randomly selected
malicious files, varying the size of the appended section used
to generate the adversarial examples.
For MalConv, adding an unused section allows an attacker
to add benign features which overwhelm the classification.
Our hypothesis is that MalConv+ should be immune to the
attack since it only learns to look for maliciousness, default-
ing to a decision of benign when no other evidence is present.
We also note that this corresponds well with how anti-virus
programs prefer to have lower false positive rates to avoid
interfering with users’ applications.
4.2 Attacking N-Gram
The N-Gram model was trained using lasso regularized lo-
gistic regression on the top million most frequent 6-byte
n-grams found in our 2 million file training set. The 6-byte
grams are used as boolean features, where a 1 represents the
n-gram’s presence in a file. Lasso performed feature selection
by assigning a weight of 0 to most of the n-grams. The result-
ing model had non-zero weights assigned to approximately
67,000 of the features.
We devise a white-box attack similar to the attack Kreuk
et al. (2018) used against MalConv in that we inject benign
bytes into an unused section appended to malicious files.
Specifically, we take the most benign 6-grams by sorting
them based on their learned logistic regression coefficients.
We add benign 6-grams one at a time to the malicious file
until a misclassification occurs. This ends up being the same
kind of approach Lowd and Meek (2005b) used to perform
“Good Word” attacks on spam filters, except we assume the
adversary has perfect knowledge of the model. The simplicity
of the N-Gram model allows us to do this targeted attack,
and specifically look at the evasion rate as a function of the
number of inserted features.
To prevent these attacks, we train N-Gram+ using non-
negative weight constraints on the same data. This model is
prevented from assigning negative weights to any of the fea-
tures. We also remove the lasso regularization from N-Gram+
as the constraints are already performing feature selection by
pushing the weights of benign features to zero.
4.3 Spam Filtering
As mentioned in the previous section, Lowd and Meek
(2005b) created “Good Word” attacks to successfully evade
spam filters without access to the model. These attacks ap-
pend common words from normal emails into spam in order
to overwhelm the spam filter into thinking the email is legiti-
mate. In their seminal work, they noted that it was unrealistic
to assume that an adversary would have access to the spam
filter, and would thus need to somehow guess at which words
are good words, or to somehow query the spam filter to steal
information about which words are good. Others have simply
used the most frequent words from the ham messages as a
proxy to good word selection that an adversary could repli-
cate (Jorgensen, Zhou, and Inge, 2008; Zhou, Jorgensen, and
Inge, 2007). We take the more pessimistic approach that the
adversary has full access to our model, and can simply select
the words that have the largest negative coefficients (i.e. the
most good-looking words) for their attack. This is the same
assumption we make in attacking the n-gram model.
By showing that our non-negative learning approach elimi-
nates the possibility of good word attacks in this pessimistic
case, we intrinsically cover all weaker cases of an adversary’s
ability. We note as well that Lowd and Meek speculated the
only effective solution to stop the Good Word attack would
be to to periodically re-train the model. By eliminating the
possibility of performing Good Word attacks, we increase
the cost to operate for the adversary, as they must now exert
more effort into crafting significantly novel spam to avoid
detection. By eliminating the lowest-effort approach the ad-
versary can take, we remediate a sub-component of the spam
problem, but not spam as a whole.
We train two logistic regression models on the TREC 2006
and 2007 Spam Corpora.2 The 2006 dataset contains 37,822
emails with 24,912 being spam. The 2007 dataset contains
75,419 messages with 50,199 of them being spam. We per-
formed very little text preprocessing and represented each
email as a vector of boolean features corresponding to the top
10,000 most common words in the corpus. The first model is
trained with lasso regularization in a traditional manner. The
second model is trained with non-negative constraints on the
coefficients in order to isolate only the features predictive of
spam during inference.
4.4 Targeted Attacks on Image Classification
For our image classification experiments we follow the rec-
ommendations of Carlini and Wagner (2017a) for evaluating
an adversarial defense. In addition to the FGSM attack, we
will also use a stronger iterated gradient attack. Specifically
we use the Iterated Gradient Attack (IGA) introduced in (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017b), using Keras for our
models and Foolbox (Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge, 2017)
for the attack implementations. We evaluated the confidences
at which such attacks can succeed against the standard and
2See https://trec.nist.gov/data/spam.html
our non-negative models on MNIST, CIFAR 10 and 100, and
Tiny ImageNet.
We note explicitly that the IGA attack is not the most
poweruful adversary we could use. Other attacks like Pro-
jected Gradient Decent (PGD) and the C&W attack(Carlini
and Wagner, 2017b) are more successfully, and defeat our
multi-class generalization of non-negative learning. We study
IGA to show that there is some benefit, but that overall the
multi-class case is a weakness of our approach. We find the
results interesting and informative because our prior belief
would have been that non-negativity would produce no bene-
fit to the defender at all, which is not the case.
We are specifically interested in defending against an ad-
versary creating a high confidence targeted attack (e.g., a
label was previously classified as “cat”, but now is classified
as “potato” with a probability of 99%). As such we will look
at the evasion rate for an adversary altering an image to other
classes over a range of target probabilities p. The goal is to
see the non-negative trained network have a lower evasion
rate, especially for p ≥ 90%.
For MNIST and CIFAR 10, since there are only 10 classes,
we calculate the evasion rate at a certain target probability
p as the average rate at which an adversary can successfully
alter the networks prediction to every other class and reach a
minimum probability p. For CIFAR 100 and Tiny ImageNet,
the larger number of classes prohibits this exhaustive pairwise
comparison. Instead we evaluate the evasion rate against a
randomly selected alternative class.
On MNIST, CIFAR 10, and CIFAR 100, due to their small
image sizes (≤ 32×32), we found that adversarial attacks
would often “succeed” by changing the image to an unrecog-
nizable degree. For this reason we set a threshold of 60 on the
L1 distance between the original image and the adversarial
modification. If the adversarial modified image exceeded this
threshold, we counted the attack as a failure. This threshold
was determined by examining several images; more informa-
tion can be found in the appendix. For Tiny ImageNet this
issue was not observed, and Foolbox’s default threshold was
used.
5 Results
Having reviewed the method by which we will fight targeted
adversarial attacks, and how the malware attacks will be ap-
plied, we will now present the results of our non-negative
networks. First we will review those related to malware and
spam detection, showing that non-negative learning effec-
tively neutralizes evasion by a malware author. Then we will
show how non-negative learning can improve robustness on
several image classification benchmarks.
5.1 Malware Detection
Using the method outlined in section 4, Kreuk et al. (2018)
reported a 100% evasion rate of their model. As shown in
Figure 2, our replication of the attack yielded similar results
for MalConv, which was evaded successfully for 95.4% of
the files. The other 4.6% of files were all previously classi-
fied as malware with a sigmoid activation of 1.0 at machine
precision due to floating-point rounding. The attack fails for
these cases since there is no valid gradient for this output.
A persistent adversary could still create a successful adver-
sarial example by replacing the sigmoid output with a linear
activation function before running the attack.
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Figure 2: Evasion rate (y-axis) for MalConv and N-Gram
based models. Top figure shows MalConv evasion as the
appended section size increases, and bottom figure shows
the N-Gram evasion as the number of benign n-grams are
added. The number of files that evade increase as the size of
the appended section increases. The evasion rates remained
fixed for all section sizes greater than 25% of the file size.
Our non-negative learning provides an effective defense,
with only 0.6% of files able to evade MalConv+. Theoreti-
cally we would expect an evasion rate of 0.0%. Investigating
these successful evasions uncovered a hidden weakness in
the MalConv architecture. We found that both MalConv and
MalConv+ learned to give a small amount of malicious pre-
Table 1: Out of sample performance on malware detection in
the absence of attack.
Classifier Accuracy % Precision Recall AUC %
MalConv 94.1 0.913 0.972 98.1
MalConv+ 89.4 0.908 0.888 95.3
N-Gram 95.5 0.926 0.987 99.6
N-Gram+ 91.1 0.915 0.885 95.5
dictive power to the special End of File (EOF) padding value.
This is most likely a byproduct of the average malicious file
size being less than the average benign file size in our training
set, which causes the supposedly neutral EOF value itself
to be seen as an indicator of maliciousness. The process of
adding an unused file section necessarily reduces the amount
of EOF padding tokens given to the network, as the file is
increased in size (pushing it closer to the 2.1MB processing
limit) the new section replaces the EOF tokens. Replacing the
slightly malicious EOF tokens with benign content reduces
the network’s confidence in the file being malicious.
The 0.6% of files that evaded MalConv+ only did so when
files were small, and the appended section ended up com-
prising 50% of the resulting binary. The slight maliciousness
from the EOF was the needed feature to push the network
into a decision of “malicious.” However, the removal of EOFs
by the unused section removed this slight signal, and pushed
the decision back to “benign.” If we instead replace the bytes
of the unused section with random bytes from the uniform
distribution, the files still evade detection. This means the
evasion is not a function of the attack itself, but the modifica-
tion of the binary that removes EOF tokens. A simple fix to
this padding issue is to force the row of the embedding table
corresponding to the special byte to be the zero vector during
training. This would prevent the EOF token from providing
any predictive power during inference.
We observed similar results for the N-Gram model. The
evasion rate increases rapidly as benign features are added
to the malicious files. We found that appending the top 41
most benign features resulted in a 100% evasion rate. This
attack is completely mitigated by N-Gram+ since none of its
features have negative weights supporting the benign class.
The only way to alter the classification would be to remove
malicious n-grams from the files. Our results for both models
are depicted in Figure 2.
Accuracy vs Defense
The only drawback of this approach is the possible reduc-
tion in overall accuracy. Limiting the available information
at inference time will likely reduce performance for most
classification tasks. Alas, many security related applications
exist because adversaries are present in the domain. We have
shown that under attack our normal classifiers completely fail
— therefore a reduction in overall accuracy may be well worth
the increase in model defensibility. Table 1 shows metrics
from our models under normal conditions for comparison.
Since different members of the security community have
different desires with respect to the true positive vs. false
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Figure 3: ROC curves for MalConv and N-Gram malware
classifiers, with and without non-negative restraints, in the
absence of attack.
positive trade-off, we also report the ROC curves for the
MalConv, MalConv+, N-Gram, and N-Gram+ classifiers in
Figure 3.
While our non-negative approach has paid a penalty in ac-
curacy, we note that we can see this has predominately come
from a reduction in recall. Because features can only indicate
maliciousness, some malicious binaries are labeled as benign
due to a lack of information. This scenario corresponds to
the preferred deployment scenario of security products in
general, which is to have a lower false positive rate (benign
files marked malicious) at the expense of false negatives (ma-
licious files marked benign) (Ferrand and Filiol, 2016; Zhou
and Inge, 2008; Yih, Goodman, and Hulten, 2006). As such
the cost of non-negativity in this scenario is well aligned
with its intended use case, making the cost palatable and the
trade-off especially effective.
To us it seems reasonable to accept a small loss in accuracy
when not under attack in exchange for a large increase in
accuracy when under attack. An interesting solution could be
employing a pair of models, one constrained and one not, in
addition to some heuristic indicating an adversarial attack is
underway. The unconstrained model would generate labels
during normal operations and fail over to the constrained
model during attack. The confidence of the constrained model
could be used as this switching heuristic as we empirically
observe that the confidences during attack are much lower.
Those who work in an industry environment and produce
commercial grade AV products may object that our accuracy
numbers do not reflect the same levels obtained today. We
remind these readers that we do not have access to the same
amount of data or access to the resources necessary to pro-
duce training corpora of similar quality, and so it should not
be expected that we would obtain the same levels of accu-
racy as production systems. The purpose of this work is to
show that a large class of models that have been used and
attacked in prior works can be successfully defended against
this common threat model. This comes at minor price, as just
discussed, but this is the first technique to show that it can be
wholly protective.
5.2 Spam Filtering
The accuracies for our traditional, unconstrained models were
high on both datasets, but both were susceptible to our version
of Lowd and Meek’s “Good Word” attack. Both classifiers
were evaded 100% of the time by appending only 7 words
to each message in the 2006 case and only 4 words in the
2007 case. These words correspond to the features with the
lowest regression coefficients (i.e., negative values with high
magnitude) for each model.
Use of the non-negative constraint lowers our accuracy for
both datasets when not under attack, but completely elimi-
nates susceptibility to these attacks as all “Good Words” have
coefficients of 0.0. The spam author would only be able to
evade detection by removing words indicative of spam from
their message. A comparison of performance is shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Out of sample performance on spam filtering in the
absence of attack.
Classifier Accuracy % Precision Recall AUC % F1 Score
2006 Lasso 96.5 0.974 0.993 97.1 0.983
2006 Non-Neg. 82.6 0.912 0.820 83.5 0.864
2007 Lasso 99.7 0.999 0.999 99.7 0.999
2007 Non-Neg. 93.6 0.962 0.940 93.0 0.951
Despite the drops in accuracy imposed by our non-negative
constraint, the results are better than prior works in defending
against weaker versions of the “Good Word” attack. For ex-
ample, Jorgensen, Zhou, and Inge (2008) developed a defense
based on multiple instance learning. Their approach when
attacked with all of their selected good words had a precision
of 0.772 and a recall of 0.743 on the 2006 TREC corpus.
This was the best result of all their tested methods, but our
non-negative approach achieves a superior 0.912 and 0.820
precision and recall respectively. While spam authors are not
as restricted to modify their inputs, our approach forces them
to move up to a more expensive threat model (removing and
modifying features, rather than just adding) — which we
argue is of intrinsic value.
Demontis et al. (2017) had concluded that there existed an
“implicit trade-off between security and sparsity” in building
a secure model in their Android malware work. At least for
the additive adversary, we provide evidence with our byte
n-grams and spam models that this is not an absolute. In both
cases we begin with a full feature set and the non-negative
approach learns a sparse model, where all “good words” (or
bytes) are given coefficient values of zero. As such we see
that sparsity and security occur together to defend against the
additive adversary.
5.3 Image Classification
Having investigated the performance of non-negative learn-
ing for malware detection, we now look at its potential for
image classification. In particular, we find it is possible to
leverage non-negative learning as discussed in subsection 3.1
to provide robustness against confident targeted attacks. That
is to say if the predicted class is yi, the adversary wants to
trick the model into predicting class yj , j 6= i and that the
confidence of the prediction be ≥ p.
For MNIST we will use LeNet. Our out of sample accu-
racy using a normal model is 99.2%, while the model with
non-negative constrained dense layers achieves 98.6%. For
CIFAR 10 and 100 we use a ResNet based architecture.3
For CIFAR 10 we get 92.3% accuracy normally, and 91.6%
with our non-negative approach. On CIFAR 100 the same
architecture gets 72.2% accuracy normally, and 71.7% with
our non-negative approach. For Tiny ImageNet, we also use a
ResNet architecture with the weights of all but the final dense
layers initialized pretrained from ImageNet.4 The normal
model has an accuracy of 56.6%, and the constrained model
56.3%. The results as a function of the target confidence p
can be seen in Figure 4.
An interesting artifact of our approach is that the non-
negative networks are easier to fool for low-confidence errors.
We posit this is due to the probability distribution over classes
becoming near uniform under attack. On CIFAR100 the y-
axis is truncated for legibility since the evasion rate of FGSM
is 93% and IGA is 99%. Similarly for non-negative Tiny
ImageNet, FGSM and IGA achieve 14% and 17% evasion
rates when p = 0.005.
Despite these initial high evasion rates, we can see in
all cases the success of targeted adversarial attacks reaches
0% as the desired probability p increases. For MNIST and
CIFAR10, which have only 10 classes, this occurs at up to
a target 30% confidence. As more classes are added, the
difficulty of the attack increases. For Tiny ImageNet and
CIFAR100, targeted attacks fail by ≤ 2%.
If targeted attacks from IGA were the only type of attack
we needed to worry about, these results would also allow
us to use the confidence as a method of detecting attacks.
For example, CIFAR10 had the weakest results, needing a
target confidence of 30% before targeted attacks failed. The
average predicted confidence of the non-negative network on
the test set was 93.8%. This means we can use the confidence
itself as a measure of network robustness. If we default to
a “no-answer” for everything with a confidence of 40% or
less on CIFAR10, and assume anything below that level is an
attack and error, the accuracy would have only gone down
1.2%.
In order to determine if non-negative constraints are merely
acting as a gradient obfuscation technique (Athalye, Carlini,
and Wagner, 2018), we also attempted a black box attack by
attacking a substitute model without the non-negative con-
straints and assessing whether the perturbed images created
by this attack were able to fool the constrained model. In or-
der to make the attack as strong as possible, the unconstrained
network was the same as the network that was used to warm-
3v1 model taken from https://tinyurl.com/
keras-cifar10-restnet
4ResNet50 built-in application from https://keras.io/
applications/#resnet50
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Figure 4: Targeted evasion rate (y-axis) as a function of the desired misclassification confidence p (x-axis) for four datasets. Due
to the differing ranges of interest, right two figures shown in log scale for the x-axis.
start the non-negative training. This should maximize the
transferability of attacks from one to the other. Despite this
similarity, transfered attacks had only a 1.042% success rate,
which is one reason we believe that non-negative constraints
are not merely a form of gradient obfuscation.
We emphasize that these results are evidence that we can
extend non-negativity to provide benefit in the multi-class
case. Our approach appears to have lower cost in multi-class
case than in the binary, as accuracy drops by less than 1%
in each dataset. While the cost is lower, its utility is lower
as well. Our multi-class non-negative approach provides no
benefit in untargeted attacks — where any error by the model
is acceptable to the attacker — even under the weaker FGSM
attack. When even stronger attacks like Projected Gradient
Descent are used, our approach is also defeated in the tar-
geted scenario. Under the moderate-strength IGA attack, we
also see that susceptibility to evasion is increased for low-
confidence evasions. In total, we view these results as indica-
tive that non-negativity can have utility for the multi-class
case and provide some level of benefit that is intrinsically
interesting, but more work is needed to determine a better
way to apply the technique.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that an increased robustness to adversar-
ial examples can be achieved through non-negative weight
constraints. Constrained binary classifiers can only identify
features associated with the positive class during test time.
Therefore, the only method for fooling the model is to remove
features associated with that class. This method is particu-
larly useful in security-centric domains like malware detec-
tion, which have well-known adversarial motivation. Forcing
adversaries to remove maliciousness in these domains is the
desired outcome. We have also described a technique to gen-
eralize this robustness to multi-class domains such as image
classification. We showed a significant increase in robustness
to targeted adversarial attacks while minimizing the amount
of accuracy lost in doing so.
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Appendix A Threshold for CIFAR
Adversaries
When creating an adversarial attack, it is necessary that some
portion of the image must be changed as an intrinsic part of
the attack. There is currently considerable debate about the
nature of how large that change ought to be, how it should be
measured, and how much we should care about the nature of
changes to the original image. All of these could be topics of
research in their own right, and we do not claim to solve them
in this work. We use the L1 distance as a measure simply
because it has been used by prior works, even if it is not ideal.
We also take the stance that it is important that no per-
ceptible difference between the input and attacked result is
important, while recognizing that is not an agreed upon pro-
cedure by everyone in the community. Intuitively we find
the lack of perceptible difference important because it leaves
no ambiguity about the ground truth label. If the input is
noticeably perturbed by an attack, the true label of the new
attacked image may come into question. Our CIFAR 10 &
100 results against the non-negative networks often produced
large differences, brining us to a need to impose a threshold
at which we will consider an attack a “failure.”
Figure 5 highlights the need to choose a threshold by pro-
viding examples of the spectrum of L1 distances we observed
between the original and the adversarial-generated images.
It starts with small distances, such as Figure 5a, which has
only an L1 distance of 10 and is clearly still a truck. At the
extreme end, we also had results like Figure 5f which had an
L1 distance of 1000, and is wholly unrecognizable. We argue
that such an attack must be a failure, as the input does not
even resemble the distribution of images from CIFAR.
The question is, where does one draw the line? While we
argue that an imperceptible difference is important to avoid
label ambiguity, we have attempted to give deference in al-
lowing large magnitude attacks while also recognizing that
L1 is not the ideal method to measure visual perceptual dif-
ference. As such we have experimentally selected a threshold
of 60 as one that allows for perceptible differences, and at
the edge of no longer being recognizable as its original class.
Our decision to use a threshold of 60 is best shown in
Figure 5c where the L1 difference starts to demonstrate an
obvious perceptible difference. We feel this image represents
a balance between the subjective ability of being able to
still tell that it is a type of car / truck, and having difficulty
recognizing what is in the image (or if it is still valid) without
the context of the original image next to it.
Allowing larger thresholds for the CIFAR attacks begins to
enter a territory where it is not clear to us that the true label
of the image has been retained. Figure 5d shows one such
example with a deer, where the adversarial image has the
same colors but is unclear to us what the adversarial image
should be labeled as.
(a) L1 difference of 10, no perceptible difference. (b) L1 difference of 30, minute perceptible difference.
(c) L1 difference of 60, obvious perceptible difference, though objects
appear mostly “the same”.
(d) L1 difference of 150, significant artifacts emerging in attack, origi-
nal object is generally unrecognizable.
(e) L1 difference of 400, original object is no longer recognizable. (f) L1 difference of 1000, the image has been completely destroyed.
Figure 5: Examples of IGA attacks against CIFAR 10 images with our non-negative network. In each sub figure, the left most
image is the original image, the middle is the attacked result, and the right shows the difference. Moving from sub-figure (a) to
(f), the L1 difference between the original and adversarial image increases.
